Can Atheism Be Epistemically Responsible When So Many People Believe in God? by Réhault, Sébasten
EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 7/1 (SPRING 2015), PP. 181-198
CAN ATHEISM BE EPISTEMICALLY RESPONSIBLE 
WHEN SO MANY PEOPLE BELIEVE IN GOD?
SÉBASTIEN RÉHAULT
Université de Lorraine
Abstract. Nowadays the argument for the existence of God based on the 
common consent of mankind is taken to be so bad that contemporary atheists 
do not even bother to mention it. And it seems very few theists think that the 
argument is worth defending. In this paper I shall argue to the contrary: not 
only is the argument better than usually thought, but widespread belief in God 
constitutes a prima facie defeater for every reasonable atheist.
‘You could say it’s as if we’ve been programmed to be collectively smart.’
James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of the Crowds
I. INTRODUCTION
When one considers the fact that several billion of the human race believe 
in the existence of God or in some kind of ultimate reality, even the most 
ardent sceptic will admit that the testimony we have on religious belief 
is quite impressive. But does this mean that the massive proportion of 
religious belief throughout human history points to the truth of that 
belief? In this paper, I will try to argue for the following thesis:
(T) Widespread belief in God is a prima facie defeater for atheism.
(T) is a version of the Common Consent Argument for the Existence of 
God, also known as the consensus gentium argument. To make it clear, 
we can consider (T) as the conclusion of the following reasoning:
(1) Widespread belief in God is prima facie evidence for theistic 
belief;
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(2) Atheism is the denial of theistic belief;
(3) Therefore, widespread belief in God is a prima facie defeater for 
atheism.
In other words, the epistemic status of atheism is undermined by the fact 
that atheists are a tiny minority in the history of humanity. The fact that 
atheism is the exception and religious belief the rule is a problem for the 
responsible atheist, who wants to believe rightly, because if almost all 
human beings, past, present and maybe future, have religious belief, then 
it is less likely that atheism is true.
In order to defend (T), I  will try to argue mainly for the truth of 
premise (1) of the argument  – providing that premise (2) is true by 
definition and that conclusion (3) logically follows from premises (1) 
and (2). The argument for premise (1) is very simple:
(1) The vast majority of people have religious belief;
(2) Therefore religious belief is likely to be true.
This argument was very popular in the past, say before the Enlightenment, 
but it has fallen on very hard times since then. Classical versions of the 
argument can be found most notably in the writings of Seneca, Cicero, 
and Calvin. For example, in the Institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin 
endorses the view that the widespread belief in God demonstrates the 
existence of an innate tendency to believe in God. And as far as we are 
entitled to attribute a theistic argument to Calvin, he seems to think that 
this innate tendency to believe in God is evidence for theistic belief. Here 
is a famous extract from the Institutes:
There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, 
an awareness of divinity. This we take to be beyond controversy. To prevent 
anyone from taking refuge in the pretence of ignorance, God himself has 
implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty [...] 
there is, as the eminent pagan Cicero says, no nation so barbarous, no 
people so savage, that they have not a deep seated conviction that there 
is a God. [...] Therefore, since from the beginning of the world there has 
been no region, no city, in short, no household, that could do without 
religion, there lies in this a tacit confession of a sense of deity inscribed 
in the hearts of all. (Calvin 1546: I, iii, 1)
Calvin’s reasoning here runs on two arguments: first, it is an indisputable 
fact that religion is universal; second, the fact that religion is universal 
makes a  major contribution to the epistemic status of theistic belief. 
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As  I  have said, with a  few exceptions, that kind of reasoning is now 
viewed with contempt and suspicion. I think two main reasons explain 
this situation.
First, it can be explained by the progressive secularization of the 
Western world. As Charles Taylor has it, the secularity consists (1) in 
the separation of religion from public spaces, (2) in  the falling off of 
religious belief and practice, and (3) in the move to a society where belief 
in God is just one option among others, and not the more natural or 
acceptable to embrace (Taylor 2007: 1-3). In such a context, appealing 
to the widespread belief in God or, even worse, to the universality of 
religion, seems far less attractive than in the times of Calvin. Religious 
belief just doesn’t seem to be universal anymore. Therefore the common 
consent argument for the existence of God cannot be valid.
Second, we have inherited from the Enlightenment a  rather 
individualistic conception of epistemology, a conception dominated by 
a principle known as the epistemic self-reliance principle. According to 
this principle, the fact that someone else believes that p is never evidence 
for p, or it is at best poor evidence which should not be trusted without 
direct access to the evidence on which these others based their belief. 
In other words, an  epistemically responsible agent must not rely on 
the testimony of others, but only on her own cognitive faculties. This 
principle implies the rejection of any authority in the epistemic domain: 
only if our reason is autonomous are we entitled to believe something. 
This idea can be traced back at least to Descartes and Locke, and has 
become prominent in the writings of Hume, Kant, and Voltaire. For 
example, in ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (1784), Kant insists that we must 
think for ourselves as individuals and never allow others to think for 
us, for to rely on others is the essence of passive thinking and prejudice. 
The motto is famous: ‘Sapere aude!’ or ‘Dare to think for yourself!’. 
Proponents of the self-reliance principle usually admit that in some 
areas, for example history or geography, testimony is inevitable, but 
that’s why we don’t have knowledge or legitimate certainty in those areas 
and that’s why those areas are not models for rational knowledge. This 
philosophical resistance to the testimony of others can be very strong: 
according to Descartes, even when the others in question are experts 
and agree on some proposition p, I cannot tell I know the proposition p 
if I only believe p on account of what the experts say, without doing the 
reasoning justifying p by myself (Descartes 1704: Rule 3). If we accept 
this principle, then a theistic argument based on the common consent of 
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people cannot be epistemically acceptable, because it consists precisely 
in relying on the authority of others.
But the stress on epistemic autonomy typical of Enlightenment 
epistemology usually goes with another principle, namely the 
evidentialist principle. According to that principle, an epistemic agent 
ought to believe what fits her evidence. One of the most striking 
formulations of evidentialism is of course that of William Clifford in 
‘The Ethics of Belief ’: ‘It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, 
to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.’ (Clifford 1877) Clifford’s 
evidentialism has been preceded notably by Hume’s rule: ‘A wise man 
[...] proportions his belief to the evidence.’ (Hume 1748)
The evidentialist principle was formulated not only to express 
how one ought to believe generally, but to show that religious belief in 
particular was unreasonable or irrational (van Inwagen 1998). For it is 
assumed that there isn’t sufficient evidence for religious belief. Notably 
all traditional arguments for the existence of God have failed. Therefore, 
the ordinary believer believes in excess of any sufficient evidence.
My aim in the following is in fact quite modest. I  want to suggest 
that there is an  epistemic tension, if not a  contradiction, between the 
self-reliance principle and the evidentialist principle. I will largely accept 
the evidentialist principle, albeit in a fallibilist way. What I will contest is 
the legitimacy of the self-reliance principle. To the contrary, I will argue 
for the epistemic value of appealing to the testimony of others and more 
specifically to common opinion as evidence for the proposition that the 
majority believes. As a consequence we can examine anew the traditional 
common consent argument for the existence of God, not as a conclusive 
proof, but as defeasible evidence that the responsible atheist should take 
into account.1
II. THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF COMMON CONSENT
The appeal to common consent is natural. Intuitively, if we find ourselves 
in a situation where we are the only one in a group of epistemic peers to 
believe that a certain proposition p is true, we will feel a kind of discomfort 
or even a cognitive dissonance (believing at the same time that we are 
1 The conclusion I argue for here is very close to that of Thomas Kelly in ‘Consensus 
Gentium : Reflections on the “Common Consent” Argument for the Existence of God’ 
(2011). This paper owes actually very much to Kelly’s work on this topic.
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right and that we can’t be right since everyone else disagrees). If we will 
not immediately think we’re wrong, on the basis of what others believe, 
at least we will feel the need to look afresh at the available evidence. The 
intuition behind that feeling has a probabilistic nature. Suppose you are 
in a mathematics class: all the students but you get the same answer to 
a particular problem. What is the chance that you are the only one to get 
it right? For the majority to get it wrong, the same cognitive malfunction 
producing the same result must have occurred many times in different 
minds. For one person to be wrong, a cognitive malfunction needs only 
have occurred once. But the latter is generally more likely. Therefore in 
a case of peer disagreement, it is generally more likely that the majority 
is right than the lonely dissenter. In such a case, the number becomes 
evidence for the truth of the proposition that the majority believes.
Note that in the mathematics class example, we need to rule out the 
possibility that the students arrived at their answer by copying from 
a single member of the group. In the case of copying from a single member, 
the evidence supplied by the fact that the majority arrived at one answer is 
no stronger than the evidence supplied by the fact that this is the answer 
arrived at by the individual from whom the others had cheated. Maybe 
this individual is the mathematical genius of the group, so her belief is 
more trustworthy than yours! But it would not be a common consent 
argument anymore, only a  particular case of testimonial belief based 
on the authority of an expert. The case of copying reveals an important 
feature of the epistemic value of common consent: massive agreement 
on a  given proposition is evidence for that proposition inasmuch as 
a significant number of people arrive independently at that proposition 
(Kelly 2011: 152). I will return later to the problem of the independence 
of belief when I discuss religious belief.
Despite the epistemic value we intuitively attach to common 
consent, appealing to popular opinion is usually held with contempt by 
philosophers. It even has a place of choice in the philosophical bestiary 
of fallacies, under the name of fallacy of argumentum ad populum. It is 
assumed that to appeal to common beliefs is contrary to the duty of the 
philosopher, which is precisely to undermine popular opinion and to 
reach (and teach) intellectual autonomy.
But exactly what is supposed to be fallacious with appealing to 
common consent? The first possibility, following the cartesian stance, 
could be to dismiss all kinds of testimonial knowledge, whether it means 
belief acquired through the authority of common consent or belief 
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acquired through the authority of a few experts. I won’t take time here 
to argue against this broad position, which is not specifically directed 
against the argument from common consent. Suffice to say that this 
position, which can be called epistemic egoism, does not seem tenable. 
First, a  coherent epistemic egoist will end up with very few rational 
beliefs, inasmuch as a considerable amount of our beliefs are acquired 
through the authority of others (Pouivet 2005: 26). Second, the epistemic 
egoist is in fact incoherent, because she cannot consistently trust her own 
epistemic faculties but not those of others, providing there is generally 
no reason to think that her faculties are more reliable or trustworthy 
than those of others (Zagzebski 2009: 88). On the contrary, a virtuous 
epistemic agent must be reminded that the outputs of others’ faculties 
should be prima facie, if not ultima facie, trusted.
Fair enough, will say the opponent to the common consent argument, 
but it only means that we sometimes need to trust others to acquire 
new beliefs: it may be justified where one of our beliefs conflicts with 
the opinion of an expert or a better informed agent, but it doesn’t imply 
that we can trust the opinion of the crowd. In other words, a virtuous 
epistemic agent is one who is able to tell the difference between reliable 
authority and unreliable authority. And as a matter of fact, the majority 
view is not reliable, so we should not trust it. To prove her case, the 
opponent to the common consent argument will probably mention 
a typical case like the flat earth case. For centuries, it seems that the vast 
majority of people believed that the earth was flat. We now know this 
belief is false. Therefore if we had based our belief on what the majority 
believed during that time, we would have had a false belief. But is that 
kind of example sufficient to show that the common consent argument 
is a  fallacy? Following Michael Huemer, I  will consider three ways to 
understand the so-called fallacy of argumentum ad populum  (Huemer 
2013: 102-105). As it will appear, neither shows that relying on common 
agreement is a fallacy.
First, the opponent of the argumentum ad populum might want to say 
that the very existence of widespread belief does not provide conclusive 
proof for the proposition that the majority believes. The argument 
would go like this: (1) there are some cases, like the flat earth case, in 
which widespread beliefs are false; (2) therefore it is not epistemically 
responsible to appeal to popular opinion.
This objection to the rationality of the common consent argument is 
not very convincing. A belief-forming method needs not be infallible to 
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be rational and useful. In fact, all or nearly all belief-forming methods 
are fallible, including sensory observation and scientific reasoning. But 
this does not show that we must consider observation, science and all 
other belief-forming methods as fallacious. There is no reason to think 
that what applies to those belief-forming methods doesn’t apply to 
the belief-forming method of common consent. And to use common 
consent as evidence for religious belief will be no exception to that 
rule: it will provide only defeasible evidence. As Michael Williams has 
it, fallibilism, based on the idea that human beings are prone to errors 
when engaging in the pursuit of truth, is the trademark of modern 
epistemology (Williams 2001: 41). A  modern version of the common 
consent argument should follow the same path.
Second, the fallacy talk might mean that the very existence of 
widespread belief does not provide any evidence at all for the proposition 
that the majority believes. That would mean that very widely held beliefs 
are correct no more often than propositions drawn at random. So 
a responsible epistemic agent should not rely on them.
That interpretation of the consensus gentium argument seems 
completely unwarranted. First, the existence of several errors produced 
by one belief-forming method does not show that method to be 
completely evidentially worthless. Of course, that response would not 
be very convincing if it appears that widely held beliefs are very often 
false. But, and this is our second response to this interpretation, there are 
remarkable correlations between popular opinions and true beliefs. For 
example, a small minority of people still believe that the earth is flat, that 
the moon landings were fake or that the American government is allied 
with grey aliens; the majority disagrees. Few people believe themselves 
to be Elvis Presley or to be made of glass, while the majority of those 
around them disagree. In all these cases, the majority is right and the 
minority is wrong. And third, as it was said earlier, taken generally it 
is more probable that the majority is right than the minority, because 
a cognitive malfunction producing the same belief is less likely to appear 
many times in different minds than to appear a small number of times. 
Therefore widely held beliefs provide more evidence than propositions 
held from random guess.
Now the last way to understand the fallacy could be the following: 
appeal to popular opinion does not provide strong evidence for the 
proposition the majority believes. That solution rules out the first solution 
(for a  belief-forming method needs not produce infallible conclusions 
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to be rational) and the second solution (for common consent does 
produce some evidence), but it denies that common consent is really 
reliable when we look for truth. There could be two ways to arrive at 
that conclusion. First, by considering that the flat earth case and a fewer 
similar cases (like, for example, the case of Giordano Bruno) constitute 
a large and random sample of popular beliefs in which a huge percentage 
turns out to be false. Second, by considering, maybe on the basis of 
ordinary background experience and knowledge, that the flat earth case 
and similar cases are typical of the situations where a dissenter believes 
against a  majority view. But neither of these two possibilities seems 
decisive.
First, we could mention several cases of popular beliefs taken from 
a really random and large sample in which a huge percentage turns out 
to be true. For example, that 2 + 2 equal 4, that Abraham Lincoln really 
existed, that human beings differ from inanimate objects, that blood has 
an important function in the body, that the sun is bigger than it seems, 
that telepathy is impossible, that birds come from eggs or that Elvis 
Presley is dead. And more controversially I would add some normative 
beliefs, like the belief that killing a child for pleasure is bad, the belief 
that it is better to be free than to be a slave or the belief that the Grand 
Canyon is sublime. Despite cases like the flat earth case, the amount of 
true common beliefs is impressive and it should then be regarded as 
evidentially relevant.
Second, if we refer to the background of our ordinary experience 
and knowledge, it is safe to say that the flat earth case is not typical of 
situations of disagreement between a minority and a majority. Based on 
our ordinary experience, a typical case of a dissenter against a majority 
view would be the one who believes that the moon landings were fake, that 
condensation trails produced by airplanes are in fact chemtrails spread 
by secret military agencies, or that the US government is responsible 
for 9/11. Based on ordinary experience, typical cases of situations of 
disagreement of a minority against a majority view are cases where it is 
highly probable that the minority is wrong and the majority right.
From all this, I conclude that the epistemic value of common consent 
is higher than it is usually thought and that it is evidentially highly 
relevant. Again, I don’t speak here of conclusive proof, but of defeasible 
or prima facie evidence that can be weakened or strengthened by other 
pieces of evidence. When common consent occurs on a given proposition 
and providing the consensus arrived at is the product of at least partly 
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independent belief, the more likely explanation of that fact will include 
the truth of the proposition, because it is more probable that a cognitive 
malfunction occurs a small number of times in a few minds than a great 
many times in many different minds. Thus, a responsible epistemic agent 
must learn to trust popular opinion and be very careful if one of her 
beliefs contradicts the majority view. As a consequence the responsible 
atheist must admit that vastly widespread religious belief is prima facie 
evidence against her own belief.
III. THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF COMMON CONSENT 
FOR RELIGIOUS BELIEF
If what has been said previously is correct, we could construct a common 
consent argument for the existence of God, based on the idea that 
widespread belief counts as prima facie evidence for that belief. The 
complete argument would go like this:
(1) Religious belief is the majority view throughout human history;
(2) Atheism is the denial of religious belief;
(3) A false belief is essentially the product of a cognitive malfunction 
of some sort;
(4) It is more probable that a cognitive malfunction occurs a small 
number of times in a few minds than a great many times in many 
different minds;
(5) Therefore religious belief is prima facie more likely to be true than 
atheism.
I  took some time to argue for premise (4), so I will take it largely for 
granted now. I  won’t take time to argue for premise (3): I  don’t think 
there is much turning on it here. I understand ‘cognitive malfunction’ 
in a very broad sense, including epistemic defaults for which the agent 
is responsible (like indifference to truth, dogmatism, or intellectual 
cowardice) and epistemic defaults for which the agent is less responsible 
or not responsible at all (like frame effects, context biases, content biases, 
defective cognitive faculties and so on).
In the conclusion of the line of reasoning, I  emphasize that the 
evidence given by widespread religious belief is prima facie or defeasible: 
by itself it is not sufficient to make belief in God permissible when all 
the evidence is taken into account (Kelly 2010: 144). It has to be weighed 
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against other pieces of evidence for and against the existence of God. 
For example, it can be weakened by contra evidence given by the divine 
hiddenness argument or by the problem of evil, as well as by naturalistic 
explanations of belief in the divine. It can also be strengthened by 
arguments like the ontological argument, the cosmological argument, or 
the design argument. The common consent about the existence of God 
is only a defeasible reason to believe, but it is nonetheless a reason. And 
a reason the atheist must take seriously.
So now we’re left with premise (1) and premise (2). The first one is 
an empirical premise. The second a logical premise.
I will begin with premise (2). Taken literally it is in fact false or at best 
approximate. Up to now I have talked interchangeably of ‘belief in God’, 
‘theistic belief ’ and ‘religious belief ’. In a broad sense, all these expressions 
are equivalent: they all point to something outside the physical universe. 
But in a narrow sense, ‘theistic belief ’ and ‘belief in God’ have a more 
precise content than ‘religious belief ’. A theistic belief is a belief in the 
existence of a certain kind of person, all powerful, omniscient, perfectly 
good, creator and sustainer of the universe, and who takes care in one 
way or another of his creation, and most notably of human beings. I take 
‘belief in God’ here to be strictly equivalent to ‘theistic belief ’. On the 
other hand, religious belief includes theistic belief and the various beliefs 
attached to it, like the particular creeds of Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam, and their variants, but it also refers to the creeds of non-classical 
theistic religions like Hinduism or pantheism, to the creeds of non-
theistic religions like the different variants of Buddhism and to all sorts 
of folk religions. In other words, one can have religious beliefs without 
believing in God or without being a classical theist, that is, while being 
some sort of atheist.
Literally speaking, atheism is not the denial of religious belief in 
general, but only of theism, which is a species of religious belief. Literally 
speaking, the denial of religious belief is metaphysical naturalism. 
Metaphysical naturalism is the claim that there are no supernatural 
entities or no entities that are not reducible to the entities appearing 
in our best scientific explanations. A religious belief implies that there 
is some ultimate and transcendent reality, it can be a personal god or 
something else, that is, a  reality not reducible to the universe as it is 
described by the natural sciences. To be more precise, I will equate here 
religious belief with what John Schellenberg calls ‘ultimism’. Ultimism 
is the view according to which there exists a  reality that is ultimate 
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metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically (Schellenberg 2005). It 
identifies the most basic level of all religious beliefs, including classical 
theism. The argument from common consent is stronger when applied 
to ultimism than to theism for at least two reasons:
(1) As ultimism includes theism, there are more people committed to 
ultimism than to theism.
(2) Some of the more conclusive evidence against theism doesn’t 
clearly apply to ultimism (for example the argument from divine 
hiddenness and the problem of evil).
In the following, and as previously, I  will not clearly choose between 
theism and ultimism, partly because the argument from common 
consent remains fundamentally the same, all things being equal, in both 
cases. The other reason is, although this paper endorses theism, I think 
a religion identified with ultimism and free of the content attached to it 
by classical theism is a very rational option.
Finally, a  few notes on the first premise of the common consent 
argument: it says that the vast majority of people believe in God or 
profess to have religious beliefs. Is that premise true? In the times of 
Cicero or Calvin, that premise was based mainly on the intuitions of the 
philosophers and theologians arguing for the argument, on the sayings of 
their relatives and on a few testimonies from abroad. Now that premise 
can be empirically tested with systematic and large surveys on the rates 
of belief in God in various countries worldwide. As a consequence, it is 
epistemically stronger than ever. I  will mention two recent surveys  to 
justify the first premise:
 – According to a  Gallup International Survey published in 2012, 
sixty per cent of the world population believes in God.
 – According to a  meta-survey made by the Pew Research Center 
and published the same year, eighty-four percent of the world 
population has a  religion, while only sixteen percent is non-
religious (which means atheist or agnostic). This meta-survey 
compiles two thousand and five hundred polls and surveys made 
in various countries worldwide.
So depending on whether you insist on classical theism or on ultimism, 
there are sixty to eighty percent of the world population that is religious. 
As I said in the beginning, the number is impressive and so it is impressive 
evidence for religious belief.
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Although the evidence is far more shallow in that case, I think that 
this empirical premise should also be considered from a  synchronic 
point of view or, maybe less pedantically, from a temporal point of view, 
that is, with an eye on the past. The percentage of ultimists and/or theists 
over the course of humanity’s history is certainly much higher than just 
present-day ultimists and/or theists. If we include the number of religious 
believers of the past to the total number of believers, the argument from 
common consent becomes stronger, albeit defeasibly.
IV. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
I turn now to the objections that can still be raised against the common 
consent argument for religious belief and I  try to show how we can 
respond to them.
The first objection points to the intellectual merits of the majority 
of religious believers. We could call it the IQ objection. According to 
it, the unsophisticated and poorly informed are overtly represented 
among theists and religious believers, whereas the well-educated and 
critical reasoners are more likely to be atheists (Kelly 2010: 149). The 
idea behind this is that if it is legitimate to rely upon the testimony 
of others, the virtuous epistemic agent is the one who discriminates 
between those who are in a  better position to judge the proposition 
in question. Generally, those in a  better position are those who have 
thought deeply on the available evidence, who are the most educated, 
informed and critical of the reasoners. Since the evidence provided by 
a small group of high-quality reasoners is supposed to be higher than 
the evidence provided by the cumulative opinion of a large number of 
people comparatively less sophisticated, and since in matters of religion, 
the sophisticated reasoners are mostly atheists and/or naturalists, then 
the stronger evidence favours atheism and metaphysical naturalism.
How can one respond to that  objection? First, as it has been 
convincingly argued for by James Surowiecki, the cumulative opinion 
of a large number of people who are not the best informed on a given 
proposition often provides better evidence for that proposition that the 
opinion of a  small number of experts (Surowiecki 2004). One of the 
main reasons that explains the performance of collective intelligence 
over the judgment of a small group of experts is the diversity of skills 
and information displayed by people in the larger group, which makes 
it smarter overall. Second, there are in fact lots of very sophisticated 
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religious believers. It is especially true if we consider the number of 
past scientists and philosophers who were theists: from a  temporal 
perspective, there are probably more sophisticated religious believers 
than sophisticated atheists. Of course, the fact that they lived in a time 
when almost everyone was a theist may have produced a context bias that 
diminishes the epistemic value of their belief. Third, it can be useful to 
point out that the majority of contemporary philosophers of religion are 
theists and/or defend the rationality of religion (according to PhilPapers 
Survey, the ratio is seven for ten). We can give two possible explanations 
of this datum.
First, the less charitable explanation: philosophy of religion attracts 
mostly philosophers who happen to be believers because they’re looking 
for a way to justify their belief. As a consequence, the fact that they find 
the arguments for the rationality of religion stronger than the arguments 
for atheism is no surprise and constitutes poor evidence for their 
belief. But there is a  more charitable explanation: even if the domain 
of religion attracts mostly religious philosophers, it doesn’t imply that 
their judgment on the epistemic value of philosophical arguments is 
completely obscured by their previous belief. They need not accept or 
reject arguments just because arguments confirm or contradict their 
belief. For if we would accept this thesis in the domain of philosophy 
of religion, we should also accept it in other areas of philosophy and 
distrust whatever philosophers have to say. For example, contemporary 
metaphysicians and philosophers of mind are mostly naturalists and 
they were probably naturalists before they engaged in their inquiries: 
does that completely undermine their alleged expertise? I don’t think 
so. So we shouldn’t apply another standard to the philosophy of religion. 
On balance, therefore, it seems safe to say that the IQ objection is not 
very strong.
The second objection I  want to examine is the objection from the 
demographics of theism. According to that objection, the widespread 
belief in God is not a significant piece of evidence for theism, because 
theistic belief is unevenly distributed around the world (Maitzen 2006). 
For example, in Saudi Arabia, 95 per cent of the population are Muslim 
and therefore theists, while in Thailand, 95 percent are Buddhist and 
therefore at most 5 per cent are theists. While atheism is virtually 
nonexistent in Africa, South America, and the Middle East, it increases 
in Europe, Canada, Japan, and Australia (Zuckerman 2011). It seems 
that the uneven distribution of belief in God is much more likely on 
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naturalism than on theism. Theistic explanations of that fact are not 
convincing, but it is easily explained by the influence of natural forces like 
culture, economics, and politics, which are not evenly distributed around 
the world. The aim of the objection is to undermine the rationality of the 
belief in a perfectly good personal god who would have implanted in all 
human beings a  disposition to believe in him, provided that we don’t 
resist him.
There are various ways to respond to the argument from the 
demographics of theism. First, it seems the objection doesn’t apply 
to the common consent argument when it is applied to religious 
belief understood as ultimism: ultimism is really universal and 
evenly distributed, almost as religion is. Second, I  think the objection 
presupposes a false alternative when it is applied to belief in God: either 
people come to believe in God because the belief is innate (and then it 
would be evenly distributed if God is good) or people believe in God 
through cultural transmission and social pressure (in which case we 
could predict that it will not be evenly distributed). But there is a third 
solution: people believe in God as a combined result of innate cognitive 
faculties (maybe implanted by God, by evolution, or by both of them) 
and cultural transmission and social pressure. That third solution has 
been convincingly argued for by cognitive scientists like Pascal Boyer 
and Justin Barrett. For example Barrett says:
[...] children have a naturally developing receptivity to many core religious 
beliefs, particularly beliefs about the existence of supernatural beings. 
Given a  little environmental encouragement, they become believers in 
superhuman agency. But this natural receptivity to religious ideas is 
limited. Many theological ideas, of the sorts religious specialists develop 
and many believers affirm as part of historic creeds do not number with 
those children are biased to acquire. Rather, these theological beliefs 
(such as nontemporality, nonspaciality, and the like) are conceptually 
difficult for children (and adults) and require special cultural scaffolding 
to spread effectively. In this regard, theological ideas share much in 
common with other ideas generated reflectively in special cultural 
conditions such as those found in modern science. (Barrett 2012: 150)
One of the factors that may contribute to a natural belief in gods is the 
human cognitive system for detective agents and agency around us. This 
adaptive system is called the Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device 
(HADD): it helped us survive in detecting predators, with nothing lost 
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when we attributed agency to the simple rustling of leaves. As Barrett 
argues, disposition to theistic belief is natural, but cultural transmission 
and social pressure play an  important role to develop and refine the 
belief. But if cultural environment can modify the content of religious 
belief, it can also diminish it or even turn it into something else. For 
example, we can predict that the HADD will be less sensitive in a safer 
environment. That’s why maybe atheism is more common in relatively 
affluent and safe post-industrial societies. Also, the natural disposition 
to explain certain events and situations by appealing to the activity of 
gods, can be satisfied by appealing to the causation of pseudo-agents 
(Barrett 2012: 212-216). Those pseudo-agents include for example Fate, 
Destiny, Chance, Providence, Nature, Government and State: we don’t 
think of them as having minds or mental states, but they play the same 
explanatory role as superhuman agency because we sometimes treat 
them as quasi-agents with quasi-intentions. So we can easily imagine 
that in some cultural areas the reference to pseudo-agents has been 
fostered without significantly altering the natural disposition towards 
belief in superhuman agency. If we consider the example of Thailand 
mentioned above, where people are mostly Buddhist, the notions of 
Karma (the chain of cause and effect) or of Samsara (the endless cycle 
of death and rebirth) can easily function as pseudo-agents. Therefore, 
the diversity of the cultural environments surrounding belief can explain 
the uneven distribution of believe in God without undermining the 
possibility that God has implanted in us an innate tendency to believe in 
Him. As a consequence, despite the uneven distribution of belief, the fact 
of common consent is still a significant piece of evidence.
The third objection  rests on the following reasoning: for massive 
agreement on a given proposition to be evidentially relevant, a significant 
number of people must have arrived independently at that proposition 
(remember the math class example and the case of cheating). But in 
the case of religious belief, we can assert that the convergence of belief 
is largely due to mutual influence and influence by common sources. 
Therefore the evidence given by massive religious belief is weaker than 
the proponent of the common consent argument claims (Kelly 2010: 
152).
There are three ways to respond to that objection. First if we consider 
religious belief on a large scale, the mutual influence of the believers is 
not absolute: it is probable that a  certain number of groups relatively 
isolated from one another nevertheless arrive at the same belief. Of 
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course it less true for theism than for ultimism. Second, as argued by 
Kelly, we should distinguish between the acquisition of religious belief 
and its persistence, which is impressive:
Even in cases in which individuals initially acquire some belief from 
a  common source, there is for each person the possibility of later 
abandoning it in the light of subsequent experience and reflection. In the 
case of religious belief, however, sufficiently many individuals do not do 
this that the strong supermajority persists over time. (Kelly 2010: 153)
For example, although we acquire the belief in Santa Claus and the belief 
in the tooth fairy because they are taught to us by our parents when 
we are children, we are a super strong majority to abandon such beliefs 
independently. On the other hand, although the proposition ‘2 + 2 = 
4’ is learnt from others and not independently, we massively persist in 
that belief over time, not because we have been influenced by others, 
but because it still seems true to us in light of subsequent experience 
and reflection. Finally, the fact that this proposition is true is the best 
explanation of the fact that it is widely held. The same could hold for 
religious belief. Thirdly, following the cognitive science of religion, we 
can distinguish between our natural tendency to believe in superhuman 
agency and later refinements of that belief inside a particular tradition: 
if the latter is acquired through cultural influence, the former is clearly 
largely autonomous. In other words several billions of human beings 
throughout history have probably arrived independently at the same 
belief, namely that there exists an  ultimate reality that transcends the 
physical universe and that is responsible for the way things are. What has 
been acquired from mutual influence is all the later religious refinements 
that effectively vary from one culture to another.
CONCLUSION
My question was: can the atheist be epistemically responsible when so 
many people believe in God? My response is yes, provided she takes the 
fact of widespread religious belief as serious evidence for that belief and 
as a defeater for her belief. Of course that evidence is defeasible: it is added 
to the total evidence available, but it does not swamp any other evidence 
we can reach. If the atheist thinks the evidence of massive religious 
belief can be defeated by other pieces of evidence (like, for example, 
the problem of evil, the divine hiddenness argument, or the argument 
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from the demographics of theism), nonetheless she will be confronted by 
a huge challenge: to explain convincingly how is it possible that several 
billion human beings, belonging to such different cultural backgrounds, 
have been trapped in such an illusion, while a few epistemic elite were 
able to escape and to switch off their natural tendency to believe in God 
or in some kind of ultimate reality. If collective intelligence has proven 
to be effective in several areas and if religious belief is almost universal, 
then it seems reasonable to trust the common judgement of mankind on 
this subject and to be sceptical about the atheist stance.
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